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There is a growing consensus among 
policymakers and stakeholders that an 
effective federal program to control 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must 
have as one element polices to hasten the 
development and commercialization of low- 
and no-carbon energy technologies, as well 
as technologies that improve end-use energy 
efficiency. Alongside policies designed to 
directly mandate GHG reductions, such as 
a GHG cap-and-trade system, policies that 
instead target the development and adoption 
of GHG-reducing technologies have been 
much discussed. While both general types of 
policies may have GHG reductions as their 
ultimate aim, technology policies are often 
framed in terms of technology-development 
activities or technology-specific mandates and 
incentives rather than primarily in terms of 
emissions.
 
A wide range of climate-related technology 
policy options are currently being employed 
or have been proposed at the federal and 
state levels. It is useful to categorize these 
options roughly according to which stage 
of the technology-development process 
they target: research, development, and 
demonstration, or widespread commercial 
deployment. This issue brief focuses on 
technology deployment, while a companion 
brief (Issue Brief #9) addresses technology 
research, development, and demonstration, 
including options for funding, institutions, and 
research policy instruments. 
After exploring various rationales and 
motivations for implementing technology-
deployment policies as part of a strategy 
for addressing climate change, this paper 
examines relevant policy options, including 
standards (e.g., technology, performance, 
and efficiency standards), subsidies (e.g., 
tax credits, tendering, loan guarantees), 
and limited liability.  A number of important 
messages emerge:
Pricing GHG emissions through a cap-and-•	
trade or tax system would provide direct, 
cost-effective, and technology-neutral 
financial incentives for the deployment of 
GHG-reducing technology.
For technology policies to help achieve •	
a given level of emissions reductions at 
lower overall social cost than an emissions-
pricing policy alone, they must be targeted 
to addressing market problems other 
than emissions reduction per se. Thus 
technology policies are best viewed as a 
complement to rather than a substitute for 
an emissions pricing policy. 
As complements to a cap-and-trade •	
system, technology policies will tend to 
lower the allowance price associated with 
achieving a given aggregate cap level, 
rather than producing additional emissions 
reductions below the cap. As complements 
to a GHG tax, such policies will tend to 
increase the total amount of emissions 
reductions achieved by a given tax. Again, 
because the emissions price may not be 
a complete measure of cost, whether 
technology policies lower the overall cost 
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to society of achieving emissions reductions depends on 
their being well-designed and targeted to addressing 
distinct market problems.
There are several specific market problems to which •	
technology deployment policies could be efficiently 
directed, if the benefits of practicable policies were found 
to justify the costs in particular circumstances. These market 
problems include information problems related to energy-
efficiency investment decisions, knowledge spillovers 
from learning during deployment, asymmetric information 
between project developers and lenders, network effects 
in large integrated systems, and incomplete insurance 
markets for liability associated with specific technologies. 
Although market problems are often cited in justifying •	
deployment policies, such policies in practice often go 
much further in promoting particular technologies than a 
response to a legitimate market problem would require. 
Therefore, while conceptually sound rationales may 
exist for implementing these policies, economists and 
others tend to be skeptical that many of them, as actually 
proposed and implemented, would provide a cost-effective 
addition to market-based policies. Critics point out that 
deployment policies intended to last only during the early 
stages of commercialization and deployment often create 
vested interests that make the policies difficult to end.
Others argue that mandating GHG reductions will be more •	
politically feasible if government includes policies tied to 
the deployment of specific technologies. These policies 
may attract more support than a pricing policy because 
they often employ “carrots” (subsidies) rather than “sticks” 
(fees or mandates), provide a way to promote particular 
technologies that have strong political constituencies (such 
as biofuels), make the cost of reducing emissions and 
adopting new technologies less visible by spreading it to 
the general taxpayer, and may not have an explicit price 
attached to them (as do emissions prices).
Technology standards and subsidies can be viewed as •	
different means to achieve the same ends (for example, 
increased energy efficiency, greater reliance on renewable 
energy). Just as there are important differences between an 
emissions-trading program and an emissions tax, however, 
standards and subsidies tend to differ in terms of who bears 
the cost, how their impact evolves over time, and what kinds 
of outcomes they guarantee (that is, whether they provide 
certainty about achieving certain deployment objectives 
versus certainty about achieving certain cost objectives).
Standards tend to guarantee that specific technologies will •	
be deployed in a certain quantity (or as a minimum share 
of the market) or that certain performance criteria will be 
achieved, but leave the cost of achieving the standards 
uncertain. Technology subsidies, on the other hand, pin 
the incremental cost spent on technology to the level of 
the incentive and leave uncertain how much deployment 
(or what level of performance) will be achieved at that 
cost. Ceilings (and floors) on credit prices within a tradable 
standards system can blur these distinctions.
Regarding distributional consequences, the cost of •	
imposing a standard tends to fall primarily on households 
and firms in the regulated sector.  By contrast, the cost 
of providing subsidies tends to fall on taxpayers more 
generally. However, this distinction can also be altered 
somewhat through self-financing mechanisms such 
as “feebates” (to promote improved automobile fuel 
economy, for example, subsidies for efficient vehicles could 
be funded by fees on inefficient vehicles). 
Different deployment policies also have different dynamic •	
properties. The incentives generated by standards are 
typically more static in the sense that industry has no reason 
to exceed the standard, which eventually becomes less 
binding as technology matures (of course, as technology 
improves, policymakers may also respond by raising 
standards).  Fixed subsidy levels, on the other hand, may 
continue to provide incremental deployment incentives, 
depending on the payment structure.
As with emission standards, the cost-effectiveness of •	
technology-oriented standards can be increased by 
incorporating flexibility mechanisms such as credit 
trading, banking, and borrowing. Likewise, tendering, or 
reverse auctions, can help facilitate cost competition by 
making subsidy recipients bid for the minimum subsidy 
needed to deliver a specified quantity of new technology.  
This approach can help reduce the cost of technology 
deployment over time by ensuring that a given expenditure 
of public resources produces the maximum amount of 
deployment (or conversely, that a given deployment target 
is achieved at the lowest possible cost to taxpayers).
Loan guarantee programs may be conceptually justified •	
if informational asymmetries exist in credit markets for 
relevant technologies. On the other hand, loan guarantees 
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create implicit subsidies; as such, their benefits must justify 
their costs. Because loan guarantees insulate projects, at 
least in part, from default risk, they can create incentives for 
developers to take on riskier projects while doing less than 
they should to guard against preventable risks.
There may be a rationale for establishing a joint insurance •	
pool or limiting liability for certain technologies like carbon 
storage if there is insufficient availability of private liability 
insurance or there are substantial potential difficulties in 
assigning liability. On the other hand, liability protection 
provides a form of implicit subsidy by insulating parties 
from potential damages caused by their technologies.  
Thus, if designed poorly they may reduce incentives for 
those parties to take appropriate actions to mitigate risks 
where possible.
Finally, a number of other polices may be critical in helping •	
certain GHG-reducing technologies compete effectively 
to potentially gain a foothold in the marketplace. The 
successful deployment of new technologies often requires 
better information and verification methods; infrastructure 
planning, permitting, compatibility standards, and other 
supporting regulatory developments; and  institutional 
structures that facilitate technology transfer, such as rule 
of law, judicial or regulatory transparency, intellectual 
property protection, and open markets. A balance must 
be struck, however, between enabling technologies to 
compete and constructing policies that preferentially 
support specific technology options or systems.
The Role of Climate Technology 
Deployment Policies
When considered alongside policies that directly mandate 
GHG reductions, additional technology policies may not seem 
necessary or desirable. After all, the market-based approaches 
featured in most recent proposals for a mandatory U.S. 
climate policy would give rise to a price on GHG emissions. 
This price places a clear financial value on GHG reductions 
and like other market prices (such as energy prices) should 
induce households and firms to buy technologies with lower 
GHG emissions (for example, more energy-efficient products) 
the next time they are in the market. 
Generic public funding for research tends to receive 
widespread support based on the significant positive 
spillovers that are often associated with the generation of 
new knowledge. Agreement about the appropriate role of 
public policy in technology development tends to weaken, 
however, as one moves from policies targeting research and 
development to policies directed at demonstration projects 
and particularly deployment. In the case of standard market 
goods, many experts (and especially economists) believe 
that while the government’s role in supporting research may 
be clear, the rationale for government intervention quickly 
weakens when it comes to commercializing and deploying 
new technology on a large scale. 
A similar point of view might carry over to the rationale 
for government intervention on behalf, specifically, of 
new technologies to reduce GHG emissions, if a sufficient 
market price has been placed on these emissions through 
government policy. This perspective would tend to support a 
complementary set of strategies that couple emissions pricing 
policies with policies to support research, development, and 
demonstration (where public investment in demonstration is 
limited and directed toward learning)—but not widespread 
deployment. There are nonetheless several economic 
rationales and other motivations for considering measures 
oriented toward technology deployment within a portfolio of 
climate policies. 
Information problems provide one rationale for policies to 
promote energy-efficient technologies. This is particularly 
the case where it has been demonstrated that consumers 
systematically undervalue energy efficiency or where the 
incentives for efficiency investments are split between those 
who pay for a new technology and those who benefit. A 
good example is the landlord-tenant problem: a landlord 
has no incentive to pay for efficiency improvements if the 
tenant pays the energy bills and therefore captures any 
resulting cost savings. Another potential rationale involves 
spillover effects and the process of so-called “learning-by-
doing”—a term that describes the tendency for production 
costs to fall as manufacturers gain production experience. 
An emissions price will encourage producers to make 
investments in new technology that result in learning-by-
doing.  But if the benefits of this learning spill over to other 
producers without full compensation to the early adopters, 
incentives for early adoption will be diluted and investment 
in learning-by-doing will fall short of what is optimal for 
society as a whole at a given emissions price.  In cases like 
this, a compelling rationale may exist, in principle, for public 
support of deployment efforts early in the transition to 
commercialization. 
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Network effects provide a motivation for deployment policies 
aimed at improving coordination and planning—and, where 
appropriate, developing compatibility standards—in situations 
that involve interrelated technologies, particularly within 
large integrated systems (for example, energy production, 
transmission, and distribution networks). Setting standards 
in a network context may reduce excess inertia (for example, 
so-called chicken-and-egg problems with alternative-
fueled vehicles), while simultaneously reducing search and 
coordination costs, but standards can also reduce the diversity 
of technology options offered and may impede innovation 
over time. Loan guarantee programs may be conceptually 
justified if informational asymmetries exist in credit markets  
for relevant technologies. Finally, incomplete insurance 
markets may provide a rationale for liability protection or 
other policies for certain technology options (for example, 
long-term CO2 storage).
The argument against technology-oriented policies, even 
where the market problems described above exist, centers 
on the concern that government is ill-positioned to “pick 
winners” among a broad array of technological possibilities 
and commercial opportunities.  Critics argue that decisions 
about new technology are best left to a private sector 
motivated through broad incentives such as a price on GHGs. 
In this view, technology deployment policies represent an 
unnecessarily restrictive and costly strategy for advancing the 
larger policy objective, where that objective—in this case, 
reducing GHG emissions—can be less expensively achieved 
through flexible market-based policies. Another perspective 
is that even if it were theoretically possible to address the 
market problems noted above through deployment policies, 
the practical import of attempting to do so would likely be 
negligible and/or more than offset by the cost and waste 
associated with pork barrel spending and unnecessary 
government intrusion into the market. From this perspective, 
simply pointing to the conceptual plausibility that certain 
market imperfections exist is insufficient; rather, one would 
need to closely measure the extent of such problems in 
specific cases and tailor policy interventions accordingly. 
This would mean identifying practicable policies that directly 
address the problems identified—and then implementing 
those policies in a manner that ensures benefits exceed costs 
(and ideally that net benefits are maximized).
The remainder of this issue brief discusses several common 
types of technology deployment policies in more detail.  A 
number of other polices and programs are not covered here, 
but may be critical in helping to enable certain GHG-reducing 
technologies to compete effectively, including: 
Information programs (such as product efficiency labeling •	
or energy efficiency audits) and programs to develop 
measurement and verification methods (for example, for 
energy-efficiency technologies, carbon storage, etc.) 
Infrastructure planning; permitting; regulatory •	
development; compatibility standards (for example, 
for fueling systems); and public outreach for specific 
technology options, systems, and networks (for example, 
transmission and distribution lines, nuclear waste storage, 
carbon capture and storage)
Programs to promote international technology transfer and •	
encourage the development of structures or institutions 
that enable technology transfer (such as rule of law, judicial 
or regulatory transparency, intellectual property protection, 
and open markets)
Before moving on to a detailed discussion of standards, 
subsidies, and liability protection as means for accelerating the 
commercialization of new technologies, it is worth emphasizing 
the general point that any deployment policy (including the 
additional types of policies noted above) must strike a careful 
balance between enabling technologies to compete and 
preferentially supporting specific options or systems.
Standards
Standards can take several forms and provide varying degrees 
of flexibility, from uniform technology standards at one 
Any deployment policy 
must strike a careful 
balance between enabling 
technologies to compete 
and preferentially supporting 
specific options or systems. 
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end of the spectrum to fully tradable emissions standards 
at the other. The cost-effectiveness of these approaches 
tends to improve as one moves from rigid technology 
standards toward standards that can be implemented using 
a market-based trading system. This is because more flexible 
standards—applied to actual emissions—can be designed 
to take advantage of all major means of reducing emissions, 
including substitution toward more efficient equipment and 
lower-carbon fuel inputs, end-of-pipe emissions control (for 
example, carbon capture and storage), and changes in end-
use demand.1 The cost-effectiveness of any type of standard—
technology-based or otherwise—can typically be increased by 
incorporating flexibility through credit trading, banking, and 
borrowing. Cost certainty can be introduced by incorporating 
price ceilings (and floors) for compliance credits, as in an 
emissions cap-and-trade system.
Uniform Technology Standards
The least flexible type of regulation is a uniform technology 
standard that requires every covered entity to install a 
particular type of technology. Examples include requirements 
that all coal-fired power plants install carbon capture and 
storage technology, that all light bulbs be fluorescent, or that 
all vehicles be flex-fuel capable. Technology standards of this 
type each take advantage of only one means of reducing 
emissions. 
In response to this critique, one might attempt to establish 
a suite of technology standards that cover every aspect of 
the system in question and thereby attempt to capture all 
abatement opportunities. But to produce cost-effective 
results, this approach would require setting each individual 
technology requirement in a way that equalized incremental 
emissions abatement costs across the system as a whole.  
Even if it were practically possible to do this for an individual 
facility or firm, it would be impossible to set a single set of 
standards that balanced the various circumstances at each 
individual firm or facility in a manner that minimized total 
costs. Uniform technology standards may also stifle innovation 
over time because once the standard is achieved there is no 
incentive to go beyond it (other than to reduce the cost of 
the approved technology). A primary advantage of uniform 
technology standards, on the other hand, is that verifying the 
installation and operation of required technologies is relatively 
easy. This advantage from an enforcement standpoint is 
unlikely to be important in an advanced industrialized country 
like the United States, but may be more relevant in certain 
1 applying flexible performance standards to equipment manufacturers, versus to direct emitters, does not 
have these properties.  Flexibility in meeting an equipment efficiency standard may lower compliance 
costs for equipment manufacturers, but will not, for example, encourage reductions in end-use energy 
demand.
developing country contexts.
Market Share (Portfolio) Standards
Market share or “portfolio” standards provide additional 
flexibility by applying requirements at an industry-wide level, 
rather than obliging every firm or facility to meet exactly 
the same technology standard. An example is a renewable 
portfolio standard designed to require that a minimum 
share of all electricity sold in a state comes from qualifying 
renewable sources. If one firm faces relatively high costs in 
delivering renewably generated power, it can buy renewable 
energy credits from a firm that faces lower costs, just as in 
an emissions cap-and-trade system. Renewable portfolio 
standards have been adopted by over 20 states and proposed 
at the federal level. In states that have such standards, 
different technologies qualify toward meeting the standard; in 
addition, some states have separate targets for specific types 
of renewable technology (e.g., solar). 
The portfolio standard concept has also been proposed for 
other types of climate-friendly technologies and even for end-
use efficiency. For example, a portfolio standard to promote 
carbon capture and storage could require that a certain 
number or share of all new fossil-fueled power plants be fitted 
with carbon capture and storage technology. Alternatively, a 
broader clean energy portfolio standard could be designed to 
include all non-carbon forms of power generation, including 
nuclear power in addition to renewables and fossil systems 
with carbon capture and storage. Similarly, some states have 
begun to experiment with “efficiency portfolio standards” that 
require utilities to meet a minimum percentage of demand for 
electricity services through energy efficiency programs (the 
same idea has also been proposed at the federal level).2
The design of such standards will obviously have a large 
impact on their cost-effectiveness. As a means of reducing 
GHG emissions, for example, a portfolio standard that 
includes more low-carbon options will tend to reduce costs 
relative to a portfolio standard that is focused on a particular 
type of technology.
Emissions Performance Standards
Emissions performance standards specify a certain maximum 
level of emissions per unit of output (for example, pounds 
of CO2 per kWh or grams of CO2 per gallon of motor fuel). 
Performance standards can also be imposed at the level of 
an individual source or, if trading is allowed, at the level of an 
2 see further discussion in issue Brief #11, which provides more detail on issues related to climate-change 
regulation in the electricity sector.
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industry or sector as a whole (in which case the standard will 
give rise to a tradable emissions credit system). Performance 
standards reflect a desire to move away from specifying 
particular technologies or classes of technology, toward a 
focus on regulating emissions in a technology-neutral fashion. 
This tendency is evident in the increasingly broad types of 
portfolio standards described above, with a “clean energy” 
portfolio standard being the broadest. From the standpoint 
of reducing emissions it might also make sense to encourage 
relatively low-emission conventional coal and natural gas 
systems, as well as more efficient electricity production and 
end-use technologies, in addition to the technologies typically 
included in renewable or clean energy portfolio standards. 
The desire to encourage a wide variety of abatement options 
leads logically back to a broad policy approach: tradable 
emissions performance standards or even an emissions cap-
and-trade system. The primary distinction between a tradable 
emissions performance standard and a cap-and-trade system 
is that the performance standard is intensity-based. That 
means the overall quantity of emissions allowed under the 
system will vary depending on the level of output (in other 
words, if a GHG performance standard, in pounds per kWh, 
is applied to electricity production, then final emissions will 
depend on how many kWh are generated). A drawback of 
intensity-based standards (relative to a quantity-based cap-
and-trade program) is that they create an implicit subsidy to 
increase output: as firms produce more, they are allowed a 
greater quantity of emissions. Any additional emissions that 
result from an increase in production, up to the level of the 
performance standard, are free to the producer.  This means, 
in effect, that firms have the ability to generate the equivalent 
of free allowances by increasing their output. As a result, 
achieving an equivalent emissions target using intensity-based 
performance standards will tend to result in higher emissions 
prices and lower output prices relative to achieving the same 
target using a cap-and-trade system. The overall cost of 
attaining a given emissions target will also tend to be higher 
because the performance standard, by keeping output prices 
relatively low, does not encourage as much end-use energy 
efficiency and conservation. 
On the other hand, the implicit allocation of credits based 
on output can protect consumers from bearing the cost of 
emissions allowances passed on to them by firms that might 
otherwise experience a windfall gain if they receive free 
allowances under a cap-and-trade program. The implicit 
allocation of emission credits to regulated entities under a 
tradable performance standard therefore produces different 
distributional effects relative to a cap-and-trade system, 
where the decision about how to allocate allowances can 
be separated from the decision about which entities get 
regulated.
Another distinction between these two approaches is that 
performance standards must be applied at the sector or sub-
sector level, where the unit of output is comparable. Unless 
sector-specific performance standards are linked through 
inter-sector emissions trading, this can lead to differences in 
the stringency of the standards applied to different sectors 
and to unnecessarily costly emissions reductions overall. 
This need to develop different output metrics and emissions 
targets for different sectors is in contrast to a cap-and-trade 
system where the only relevant units are tons of emissions 
and where the system can apply on an economy-wide scale. 
Nonetheless, tradable performance standards hold some 
political appeal because they tend to keep output prices 
lower than under a cap-and-trade system, because they deal 
with credit allocation implicitly rather than explicitly, and 
because they tend to push regulatory decisions toward the 
sector level where they can be more readily managed by 
organized interests.
Energy Efficiency Standards
In contrast to emissions performance standards, energy 
efficiency standards regulate energy use—rather than 
emissions generated—per unit of output. In the United States, 
energy efficiency standards for equipment used in buildings 
The cost-effectiveness of any 
type of standard—technology-
based or otherwise—can 
typically be increased by 
incorporating flexibility 
through credit trading, 
banking, and borrowing.
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have historically been applied in the form of minimum 
efficiencies for individual products (for example, refrigerators, 
air conditioners), while efficiency standards for automobiles 
have been applied in the form of fuel-economy standards 
averaged across manufacturers’ fleets (where standards 
have to be met separately for each automobile company’s 
domestic-car, imported-car, and light-truck fleet). 
A number of recent proposals, however, have called for 
reforming the corporate average fuel economy or CAFE 
system to make it more flexible while simultaneously 
making the overall program more stringent.  Specifically, 
recent proposals would allow CAFE compliance credits to 
be traded across fleets and across manufacturers. Similarly, 
as has already been noted, there is interest in “energy 
efficiency portfolio standards” that would target aggregate 
reductions in electricity use, rather than the efficiency levels 
of specific products. In the latter case, quantifying and 
verifying electricity savings (relative to what would have 
otherwise occurred) is more challenging than measuring 
renewable energy output, emissions, or the energy-efficiency 
of individual technologies. This presents a significant hurdle 
to the implementation of an efficiency portfolio standard that 
has the same simplicity and credibility as trading programs 
based on more readily measured metrics or characteristics. 
Nonetheless, some states have developed methods for 
measuring demand reductions and are beginning to include 
energy savings from conservation programs along with 
renewable energy in their portfolio standards.
As discussed earlier, the primary economic rationale for 
including energy efficiency standards in a suite of climate 
technology deployment policies is if there are verifiable 
market problems that result in sub-optimal purchasing 
decisions regarding the energy-related operating costs of 
vehicles and equipment. Such a rationale would continue 
to exist even with a CO
2 pricing policy, as any market 
problems that resulted in the undervaluation of future energy 
savings would also act to diminish the full impact of the 
emissions price in terms of creating incentives for energy-
efficiency improvements. The relevant economic question 
then becomes how to set the stringency of the energy-
efficiency policy so as to maximize its net benefits, taking 
into account all relevant costs and benefits. Analysts differ in 
their assessments concerning the extent to which consumers 
and firms really undervalue energy efficiency when making 
purchase decisions about energy-using equipment—indeed, 
this debate has persisted since the 1970s. Efforts to improve 
methods for measuring and verifying the effectiveness of 
energy-efficiency programs also continue and are receiving 
increased scrutiny as the expectations for these programs grow.  
Subsidies
Mechanisms for subsidizing climate-friendly technologies 
come in a wide variety of forms, including tax credits, 
direct payments, tendering or reverse auctions, and loan 
guarantees. In the context of an emissions trading program, 
it is also possible to subsidize certain technologies through 
differentiated allowance allocation.3  The common feature 
of these approaches is that they provide a positive financial 
incentive for purchasing and/or using particular technologies. 
Subsidies can be designed to reach the same ends as 
standards, but they operate by providing financial “carrots” 
rather than a regulatory or financial “sticks.” This feature can 
have distinct political advantages compared to standards 
and market-based emissions policies, although it is worth 
noting that standards may hold greater appeal for technology 
suppliers because they provide a more guaranteed market. 
For example, increased renewable electricity generation 
can be pursued through either a production tax credit or a 
renewable portfolio standard (in fact, both are being used 
in the United States today in the sense that many states 
have introduced renewable portfolio standards on top of an 
existing federal production tax credit for renewable energy 
sources). Increased ethanol production can be induced 
through an excise tax credit or a renewable motor fuel 
standard (again, both are currently being used in the United 
States). Of course, a market-based policy that puts a price on 
emissions also provides positive financial incentives for the 
adoption of GHG-reducing technology—and does so in a 
technology-neutral fashion. 
As means to achieving a particular technology end, however, 
there are several important differences between subsidies 
and standards. First, subsidies can guarantee a lower and 
upper limit to the amount of resources spent on technology 
deployment—either on an incremental basis, by setting 
the level of subsidy provided per unit of output (e.g., cents 
per kWh), and/or in aggregate by capping the total subsidy 
amount made available (total $). A price guarantee is often 
mentioned by renewable electricity developers as a positive 
feature of policies such as “feed-in tariffs,” which guarantee a 
minimum price for renewable electricity delivered to the grid 
(Germany’s system being an example). But subsidies do not 
guarantee that a particular technology-deployment target will 
3 For example, the bill introduced by senators Bingaman and specter in the 110th congress (s. 1766) 
provides “bonus” allowances for carbon capture and sequestration. in the european union’s emissions 
trading scheme, different allocation rules for new facilities subsidize different technologies, though not 
always in a way that produces climate-friendly results.
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be met—they may produce results that under- or over-shoot a 
particular target. Standards, on the other hand, can guarantee 
a particular level of performance in an individual technology 
or an aggregate penetration level or market share, but their 
ultimate cost is not known in advance. Including a price ceiling 
in the design of a tradable standard can blur this distinction, just 
as including a “safety valve” mechanism may blur the distinction 
between an emissions tax and a cap-and-trade system. 
Second, subsidies require explicit or implicit (in the case of tax 
credits) financial outlays from the public treasury.  By contrast, 
the cost of standards is born by producers and consumers 
within the regulated sector. This may be viewed as positive 
or negative depending on one’s view of whether the broad 
beneficiaries of reduced climate risks (taxpayers) should 
pay for emissions reductions, or rather that the cost burden 
should fall on a narrower group of sources and consumers 
who impose those climate risks through their emissions.  
Alternatively, the difficulty of raising public funds might be 
seen as an argument in favor of standards. A third related 
difference is that subsidies drive the prices of outputs like 
electricity and motor fuel lower, which removes incentives for 
demand reductions and in fact encourages increased demand 
for, and supply of, energy services. This is a fundamental 
distinction and it leads most economists to the view that 
negative externalities, such as GHG emissions, are best 
addressed through policies that raise the cost of behaviors 
that produce those externalities while positive externalities—
such as the spillover benefits and knowledge creation 
associated with research and development—are better 
addressed through policies that provide positive incentives. 
As discussed previously, however, variations of this general 
principle may be justified if technology subsidy policies are in 
fact designed to act as complements to an emissions policy 
in order to generate positive knowledge spillovers through 
learning and cost reduction for new technologies.4 This 
implies that subsidy policies should only target technologies 
for which clear learning opportunities exist and should do so 
only in a limited fashion early in the deployment process. It 
should also be the case that subsidies elicit investment and 
produce learning that would not otherwise be undertaken by 
the private sector in response to the emissions policy alone. 
These criteria would likely not be met by a number of existing 
subsidies or mandates, many of which target relatively mature 
technologies (e.g., wind power, corn-based ethanol) where 
markets are well-established and significant early learning has 
already been achieved. 
4 For example, when one company builds and operates a carbon capture and storage facility, it learns ways 
to implement this technology more cheaply. this knowledge is directly or indirectly shared with (that is, it 
spills over to) other companies as they build other facilities.
Finally, subsidies often require relatively large outlays of 
funding (or equivalently, they forego large amounts of revenue 
that would otherwise be collected by the public treasury) 
for the amount of incremental technology deployment they 
induce. This occurs because, under many subsidy designs, 
the subsidy accrues to parties that would have adopted the 
technology even absent the subsidy. So-called “free-riding” 
behavior—which studies have found can be quite high—will 
dilute the effectiveness of the policy in the sense that it 
reduces the actual environmental benefit achieved for a given 
expenditure of public resources. Some subsidy designs, such 
as tendering (reverse auctions) and loan guarantees, can 
be structured to better target truly incremental technology 
investment. Different types of subsidies also differ in terms 
of how they affect the budget (e.g., tax credits versus direct 
appropriations), and in terms of who is eligible or in a position 
to benefit (e.g., private companies who pay taxes versus 
public cooperatives that do not). The remainder of this section 
discusses the design and potential role of specific types of 
subsidy policies, including tax credits, tendering, and loan 
guarantees.
Tax Credits and Grants
Tax credits are often given to offset corporate income, 
personal income, sales, and property taxes as a form of 
technology subsidy. Tax credits can directly lower the up-
front investment cost of new equipment; alternatively tax 
credits can be used to subsidize actual production using new 
equipment. Examples include the existing, federal renewable-
energy production tax credit and similar, recently enacted 
tax credits for investments in new nuclear power generation 
and energy-efficient building equipment. Each type of tax 
credit has advantages and disadvantages in terms of how 
effectively it promotes technology deployment and makes use 
of limited resources. A generic disadvantage of tax credits is 
that they are ineffective if the relevant party has no taxable 
income (unless the tax credit is refundable), as may be the 
case for some start-up companies and certainly is the case for 
municipal and cooperative utilities that have no tax liability. In 
addition, the effectiveness of the credit is dependent on the 
larger tax code under which the credit is being granted.  
Investment tax credits can be quite effective in promoting 
technology deployment because the entire incentive is 
provided up-front. Grants or direct investment subsidies 
likewise share this property; moreover, like investment tax 
credits, which typically cover only a portion of the investment, 
they can be designed to encourage or require cost-sharing. 
Grants have the advantage that they can be effective with 
entities that do not have taxable income; in addition, there 
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is no lag between the time when the recipient has to put up 
funds for a project and the time when the subsidy benefit 
accrues. On the other hand, investment tax credits and grants 
provide no guarantee that the projects or technologies they 
subsidize will actually be used in the manner and to the extent 
needed to justify the investment. In addition, investment tax 
credits can encourage project developers to focus on inflating 
cost estimates (so as to maximize tax benefits) rather than 
on efficient production. Addressing this concern may require 
costly project monitoring. 
Tax credits based on production, rather than investment, 
help to ensure that public resources go only to technologies 
that are actually used (an example is the current federal 
renewable-energy production tax credit, which is based 
on kWh generated rather than on investment in renewable 
energy projects). The disadvantage of production incentives 
is that they may be less effective at overcoming deployment 
hurdles in cases where up-front capital requirements present 
a significant challenge for new technologies. Given that there 
is often a significant lag between the initial financing of a 
project and actual production, and given that the availability 
of tax credits in future years may be subject to Congressional 
appropriations, firms may not be able to capitalize expected 
tax savings at the time the investment is made. Finally, 
production tax credits do little to address construction 
risk—that is, the possibility that a project, especially if it 
involves unfamiliar or groundbreaking technology, will never 
be successfully completed and produce useful output.  
Tendering Policies (Reverse Auctions)
Tendering refers to a policy in which project developers 
submit proposals for new facilities and bid the minimum 
price they would accept for output. A government agency or 
authorized agent manages the reverse auction, accepting the 
lowest bids (hence the term ‘reverse auction’). This approach 
forces would-be subsidy recipients to compete on the basis 
of cost. It has the advantage of maximizing the amount of 
deployment achieved for a given expenditure of public 
resources (or alternatively, of minimizing taxpayer outlays for a 
given amount of deployment) and can help reduce the cost of 
technology deployment over time. 
For example, the United Kingdom established the Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation, a sequence of tendering auctions, between 
1990 and 1999. During the course of the program the average 
price paid for electricity from large wind power projects 
reportedly fell by 75 percent, although other factors clearly 
contributed to this decline as well. From 1998 to 2001, the 
state of California held three reverse auctions for renewable 
energy. The Department of Defense, the U.S. Postal Service, 
and several other states have also used reverse auctions to 
significantly reduce government costs for certain purchases. 
Reverse auctions are likely to be most efficient for high-dollar, 
large-quantity, clearly-defined purchases where there are 
multiple potential suppliers. 
Another concern that has been raised about reverse auctions, 
and indeed about technology deployment policies more 
generally, is that they tend to support whatever qualifying 
technology is currently least expensive, rather than technologies 
that might have greater potential in terms of the performance 
improvements and cost reductions that could be achieved 
through learning-by-doing. From this perspective, it makes 
sense to target deployment policies intended to promote 
learning-by-doing to a relatively narrow set of technologies 
where the potential for knowledge gains and related spillovers 
is highest. The rationale for narrowly targeting deployment 
policies may seem at odds with the notion that the broadest 
possible program coverage—in the context of an emissions 
pricing policy—will yield the least expensive reductions. In 
fact, the same arguments for broad coverage would apply to 
technology deployment policies if their primary purpose was to 
produce near-term emissions reductions. 
As discussed earlier, however, the economic rationale for 
The economic rationale for 
technology deployment 
policies rests on society’s 
interest in promoting 
complementary knowledge 
creation and dissemination—
especially where new 
knowledge is critical to lower 
the cost of future emissions 
reductions. 
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technology deployment policies rests on society’s interest 
in promoting complementary knowledge creation and 
dissemination—especially where new knowledge is critical 
to lower the cost of future emissions reductions. Thus, 
technology deployment policies should not be considered 
a substitute for cost-effective emissions policy and 
different design considerations should apply. As discussed 
previously, yet a different rationale applies in the case of 
deployment policies targeted specifically to energy-efficiency 
technologies: for the most part these policies, rather than 
being designed to generate new knowledge, serve a 
distinct informational purpose in terms of addressing market 
problems that affect energy operating-cost decisions.
A different concern is that a reverse auction system may 
favor incumbents who can submit lower bids due to size and 
experience. While low bids are an otherwise good thing, a 
competitive market is necessary for truly competitive bidding 
and it would be important to ensure that the market is indeed 
not captured by a small number of companies. Another 
issue that can arise is that many winning projects may go 
undeveloped, which can be a concern when the subsidy is 
delivered via investment tax credits that are pre-assigned due 
to credit caps (as they typically are). 
Tendering auctions can be designed to address many of 
these concerns and could be legislated with the flexibility to 
adapt over time based on the results of previous auctions and 
ongoing technological developments. Among other things, 
a reverse auction can be subject to mandatory quantity levels 
and bid ceilings that might change subject to lessons learned 
in the previous round. Mechanisms can be incorporated in 
the way the auction is structured to prevent speculative bids; 
examples include requiring bidders to obtain prior planning 
permission or requiring winners to apply for relevant permits 
within a short period of time or lose the bid. The costs 
associated with these requirements may deter false bids, 
but may also create a trade off in terms of raising additional 
barriers to entry in the competition. 
Loan Guarantees
In a loan guarantee program, the government takes 
responsibility for a certain portion of a loan in case the 
debtor defaults. Such programs may be conceptually justified 
if informational asymmetries exist in credit markets for 
relevant technologies. Technologies that are on the cusp of 
commercial viability—even if they appear very promising—
may not be able to get loans at appropriate rates in private 
credit markets, either because they seem likely to default or 
because potential lenders simply lack the information needed 
to assess default risk. By vouching for these perceived “high-
risk” projects, the government can give project developers 
access to lower-cost capital and thereby facilitate the early 
deployment of new technologies. Loan guarantees represent 
an implicit subsidy, however, and as with all other types of 
subsidies it is important that their benefits justify their costs. 
Because such guarantees insulate projects, at least in part, 
from default risk, they may create incentives for developers to 
take on riskier projects and do less than they should to protect 
against preventable risks. 
Loan guarantee programs have been used extensively in the 
past for various social purposes, and their role in the energy- 
and climate-policy arena was recently expanded by the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, which established a new loan guarantee 
program for clean energy technologies. Loan guarantees 
may be of more use to independent power producers and 
start-ups, as most investor-owned utilities have strong credit.  
Similarly, public and co-op utilities probably would not benefit 
from such guarantees since they generally borrow at rates that 
are already at or below the Treasury bond rate. 
There has been some prior experience with the use of loan 
guarantees to encourage the commercialization of energy 
technologies. In the late 1970s, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) underwrote loan guarantees of up to 75 percent of 
debt financing for start-up plants to produce synthetic fuel. 
Under that program, DOE guaranteed $1.5 billion of the $2.2 
billion Great Plains Coal Gasification Facility; after completion, 
the owners defaulted on the loan and abandoned the plant 
to DOE. The new owner, Dakota Gasification Company, now 
operates the plant at a net profit and some of the revenues 
are going to paying off DOE’s original investment. 
DOE has also provided loan guarantees for up to 90 percent 
of project debt financing and up to 90 percent of total 
costs for alcohol-fuel production facilities. In this case, DOE 
issued three loan guarantees for the construction of ethanol 
plants. One of the recipients, the New Energy Company, 
defaulted on its loan and DOE paid out the guarantee.  
After much refinancing, the company has become a major 
ethanol producer in the Midwest. Plant developers in two 
other instances also defaulted, but without a silver lining; 
one plant was sold for salvage and the other was dismantled 
and reconfigured. Another DOE loan guarantee program, 
for geothermal power, underwrote debt up to 75 percent of 
total project costs. Of eight projects, four defaulted. However, 
one developer used the DOE guarantee to build a successful 
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geothermal-powered electric generation plant. After paying 
off its loan, the project developer used the experience to 
get private financing for several other facilities in California, 
eventually expanding to other states and abroad.
As this record suggests, the results of loan guarantee 
programs for energy technologies have been mixed, with 
many projects eventually defaulting on their loans and 
triggering a government payout. However, some recipients 
have leveraged the experience gained through projects 
backed by loan guarantees to establish a successful position 
in the energy sector. In any event, given the historic default 
rate it seems clear that these were not simply cases of 
asymmetric information, where private lenders didn’t 
understand the technology or misperceived project risk. 
These projects really were high-risk, as evidenced by the fact 
that many of them ultimately defaulted. 
In this context, questions have been raised concerning the 
implementation of “no-cost” loan guarantees for clean energy 
technologies currently under development at DOE, where 
the implicit credit subsidy provided by the guarantee is to 
be paid to DOE by the borrower at the time of the loan. It 
will be a challenge to determine the appropriate level of this 
payment if the government truly expects to bear no cost from 
guaranteeing the loan. Based on past experience, the cost 
of the credit subsidy may be substantial, which would imply 
that the borrower’s upfront payment to DOE would also need 
to be substantial. If set too high, however, this payment might 
negate the appeal of the guarantee. In principle, an accurately 
set credit subsidy payment sets the loan guarantee at the 
appropriate level by solving the problem of asymmetric 
information (i.e., borrowers are in a better position to 
assess the risk of a specific project than lenders) rather than 
acting as an implicit subsidy. If the credit subsidy is paid 
for by appropriations from public funds, however, the loan 
guarantee becomes another form of subsidy. Even then, loan 
guarantees may represent an attractive alternative to other 
types of subsidies because they provide a useful screening 
mechanism for focusing subsidies on marginal projects and 
thereby mitigate, at least to some extent, the subsidy “free-
rider” problem. In other words, this form of subsidy only costs 
the government money if a project defaults, in which case the 
project was probably sufficiently risky that it would not have 
gone forward without the additional incentive provided by 
loan guarantees.
limited liability
Due to the prevalence of coal in electricity generation, a 
major focus of recent climate-policy discussions has been 
overcoming hurdles to the commercialization of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology. CCS entails capturing 
carbon released during energy production and sequestering 
it underground. Since the effects of a large accidental release 
of sequestered CO2 would undo the GHG benefits of the 
technology—and could potentially create additional risks to 
human health or the environment5—the liability involved in 
early CCS projects could discourage investment in related 
technologies. By capping either the magnitude of damages 
or the timeframe over which a CCS project operator is liable 
for such risks, the government could alleviate a potentially 
major impediment to commercializing CCS technology. The 
economic rationale for a government role in establishing 
a joint insurance pool or limiting liability is strongest if 
insufficient private liability insurance is available or if there 
are substantial difficulties in assigning liability. The latter 
issue is particularly significant given the decadal to century-
long timeframes relevant for CO2 storage and given the 
potential for sequestered CO2 to migrate through very large, 
interconnected underground reservoirs. On the other hand, 
liability protection provides a form of implicit subsidy by 
insulating parties from potential damages caused by their 
actions; as such, it may reduce incentives for those parties to 
take appropriate steps to mitigate risks where possible.
Previous Experience with Liability Caps
The federal government has established several liability caps 
in the past. The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity 
Act limits the liability of nuclear generation facilities. Reactor 
licensees are required to purchase the maximum amount 
of private insurance available ($300 million). Each licensee 
must also be prepared to contribute up to $95.8 million to an 
industry insurance pool in the case of an accident. Beyond 
these limits, there is no further private liability. The Montreal 
Convention limits the liability of airlines for damages incurred 
by passengers on international flights. The Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA), which applies to oil spills on water, limits liability based 
on the type and tonnage of a vessel. The OPA also governs 
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is funded by a 5 cent-
per-barrel tax on oil. The fund is capped at $2.7 billion and 
may be drawn upon if a responsible party can absolve itself of 
charges of negligence and legal violations.
5  a significant accidental release of co2 has the potential to acidify soil or water, or even—under circum-
stances where the gas is trapped in an enclosed space—to suffocate animals and people.
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The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act establishes protocols for 
government assistance in the case of a major terror incident.  
The Act is triggered in cases where losses exceed $100 
million.  First, individual insurers must pay an amount up to 20 
percent of their total earned premiums.  After that threshold 
is passed, the federal government covers 85 percent of 
remaining damages. If damages to an industry are less than 
$27.5 billion, however, the assistance must be recouped from 
individual insurers as a surcharge on all commercial insurance 
premiums. There is an overall cap of $100 billion on total 
annual federal assistance.
Addressing Liability Issues for Carbon Storage
In addressing liability issues related to carbon storage, 
concerns about the potential climate impacts of CO2 leakage 
back to the atmosphere should be treated separately from 
concerns about the potential for human health and local 
environmental damages in the event of a large-scale release. 
In addition, it will be important for liability policies to be clear 
in terms of which components of the storage system (e.g., 
transmission, injection, storage) they cover and when they 
start and over what time periods they apply (e.g., immediately 
upon project completion, after an initial period once capture 
and storage are underway, etc.). 
In the case of carbon storage, the great diversity of possible 
sequestration sites makes estimating potential risks 
and damages difficult. Whereas the other liability funds 
discussed above were based on at least some actuarial 
data, little data exist for CCS technology and it is not clear 
that related practices—such as enhanced oil recovery—are 
sufficiently similar to provide reliable projections about the 
likely performance of large-scale CCS projects. Still, a small 
surcharge on carbon storage or other related activity is one 
option for supporting a CCS liability fund similar to the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund. Another option for addressing 
climate-related liability concerns (as opposed to health and 
local environmental concerns) is to apply a small discount 
factor to carbon storage credits (if the potential for leakage is 
judged to be non-negligible); another is for the government—
after some period of time—to assume any regulatory liability 
should such leakage occur. 
The FutureGen initiative, which aims to have a working power 
plant with CCS operating by 2012, has already generated 
some activity in terms of liability policy. The final four potential 
sites for this initiative are in Texas and Illinois, and Texas 
has agreed to accept full liability for the project should it 
be located there. Illinois initially balked at offering liability 
protection, but has now adopted similar liability protections. 
It remains to be seen whether other states would accept this 
responsibility, or whether it will be adopted at a federal level. 
A potential downside is that federal liability protection could 
have the effect of associating CCS with nuclear power (which 
has a similar liability cap) and influencing perceptions about 
the potential for catastrophic damages. However, experts 
on carbon storage point out that the risk profile for CCS 
technology is fundamentally different from that of nuclear 
technology. Carbon storage appears likely to become safer 
(less prone to leakage) over time as the CO2 is dissolved 
or trapped in surrounding water or porous rock. The risks 
associated with storing nuclear waste, on the other hand, 
arguably increase over time in the sense that the potential for 
leakage may be higher in the future than it is in the present 
(although the consequences of such leakage also become 
less severe over time as the waste decays and its radioactivity 
declines).
